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This paper tests whether and how political regimes influenced the cost of public 
borrowing by comparatively and quantitatively examining a newly compiled 
dataset on public annuities in early modern Italy. The analysis finds that overall 
political regimes mattered a lot, but there were important differences across 
their dimensions. Fiscal centralisation, particularly in the eighteenth century, was 
not associated with significant decreases in the interest rates. Jurisdictional 
fragmentation was on the whole the most important variable, with feudalism 
and to a lesser extent clerical influence significantly increasing the cost of 
borrowing. Constitutional representation was even more important than 
jurisdictional fragmentation within republics, but a republican constitution had 
an ambivalent effect: while it decreased the risk of default it could also lead to 
an increase in interest rates, depending on the specific institutional setting, 
contingency and path-dependency. 
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1. Introduction 
Increasingly, economic historians emphasise the centrality of transaction costs 
and capital markets for the performance of pre-modern economies (North, 1990; van 
Zanden 2009; Persson, 2010). North and Weingast’s (1989) celebrated article on how 
the Glorious Revolution enabled the English monarchy to credibly commit to repay its 
debt was followed by a rapid expansion of the literature exploring the linkages between 
political regimes and the cost of borrowing. Still, there is no consensus on whether and 
how regime type influences interest rates on public borrowing.  
Beginning with the sceptics, Clark (1996) finds that the decline in interest rates in 
eighteenth-century England had little to do with constitutional changes: there was no 
structural break in 1688. Likewise, Epstein (2000) claims that urban republics did not 
enjoy an automatic financial advantage over monarchies: long-term convergence (1350-
1750) shows that initial disparities were due to different levels of development of 
financial institutions. Along similar lines, Sussman and Yafeh (2000, 2006) argue that in 
both nineteenth-century Japan and early modern England constitutional reform was not 
accompanied by a rapid fall in the cost of public borrowing; its dynamics were primarily 
shaped by geopolitics. 
While now few are willing to accept North and Weingast’s (1989) initial 
argument without qualifications, many continue to hold that the link between political 
regimes and interest rates is valid. In a series of books and articles, Stasavage (2003, 
2007, 2011) explains away apparent anomalies in pre-modern European data by 
arguing that constitutional representation significantly decreased the cost of borrowing 
when capital-, rather than land-owners, were in power, their representation was 
intensive and polities were relatively small. Zuijderduijn (2009) and Dincecco (2009a, 
2011) claim that constitutional representation is a major factor in explaining low interest 
rates, while holding that political centralisation is equally important. Still they stress 
different aspects of centralisation; where Zuijderduijn (2009) emphasises jurisdictional 
centralisation as a means to produce a homogeneous, transparent and predictable 
institutional framework,2 Dincecco (2009a, 2011) highlights that fiscal centralization is 
needed to avoid free-riders problems and ensure a regular revenue stream. Velde and 
Weir (1992) go even farther in this direction: in their view the opposition of local 
parliaments to raising taxes, rather than the lack of constitutional representation, was 
the main factor behind comparatively high interest rates in eighteenth-century France. 
This paper contributes to the debate on the impact of political regimes on the 
cost of public borrowing by quantitatively examining a newly compiled dataset on 
interest rates on public annuities in early modern Italy. The political fragmentation that 
characterised the peninsula, together with a relative abundance of relevant sources, 
implies that the influence of political regimes, or lack thereof, can be systematically 
explored. What is more, a focus on early modern Italy exhibits two distinctive 
advantages: firstly, the conditions of purchase of the annuities were relatively 
homogeneous, making interest rates particularly suitable for comparison; and, secondly, 
                                                 
2 On feudalism and transaction costs see also van Zanden (2009) and Volckart (2000, 2002a, 
2002b, 2004). 
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considering only a few states allows an in depth examination of regime types, beyond 
the quantitative study of constitutional representation. Thus, this paper combines 
comparative and quantitative analysis, extends the quantitative analysis of fiscal 
centralisation of early modern political regimes, and offers the first quantitative analysis 
of the role of jurisdictional fragmentation. 
In so doing, it argues that political regimes mattered a lot. Indeed, regime type 
explained most of the variation in the cost of public borrowing across states. Still, it is 
important to distinguish. At the time, fiscal centralisation mattered little, if at all; this 
emerges particularly clearly in relation to eighteenth-century fiscal reforms, which did 
not have any discernible effect on the cost of public borrowing. By contrast, 
jurisdictional fragmentation overall mattered the most; thus, feudalism in particular 
significantly increased interest rates. Constitutional representation mattered even more 
than jurisdictional fragmentation within republics, but its effect was ambivalent. While, 
on the one hand, a republican constitution, more effectively than a parliament, 
decreased the risk of default, on the other hand, it could also create scope for oligarchs 
to set interest rates above the cost-minimising level. Whether this opportunity was 
exploited depended on the specific institutional setting, contingency and path-
dependency. 
 
2. The cost of public borrowing  
Following a standard approach in the cliometric literature (Clark, 1996; 
Stasavage, 2007, 2011; Sussman and Yafeh, 2006; Dincecco, 2009a, 2011), this paper 
measures the cost of public borrowing with the nominal interest rate paid on public 
annuities. Specifically, this refers to the proportion of the capital invested returned every 
year to the buyer of the annuity. Although the use of nominal, instead of real, interest 
rates is mainly dictated by the difficulty of finding reliable local price indexes, its use is 
relatively innocuous in studies where the focus is on cross-sectional variation, such as 
this one. This is particularly so in the light of the fact that price shocks were transmitted 
across Italian markets already in the early modern years (Chilosi et al. forthcoming); 
hence, inflation rates were bound to be similar across cities. Moreover, just like us, early 
modern investors lacked detailed information on price trends; hence, the extent to 
which they based their decisions on real as opposed to nominal interest rates remains 
open to questions (Pezzolo, 1995: 297).3  
                                                 
3 What is clear is that investors were aware that debasements could erode the real value of 
annuities. Informal institutions, such as the Venetian habit of prompting the mint officials to 
“diligently accept only … good [money], and not those which decline in goodness and weight” 
(ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Zecca, r. 3: 95), or the Piedmontese habit of denominating the value of 
annuities in gold currency (Stumpo, 1984: 199) mitigated this risk. In the Republic of Genoa, the 
right of creditors to keep the real value of their securities constant was sanctioned by law from 
1637 (Felloni, 2007: 147). Judging from the story of the Monte del Vino issued by Bologna in 
1540, formal institutions were quite effective, if not exactly speedy, at rectifying reductions in the 
real value of annuities resulting from monetary policies. Thus, in 1691 creditors challenged the 
authorities on the ground that they should receive “the right value of the gold scudo in gold 
current at all times”; eventually, at the end of 1739, the creditors’ cause was backed by the 
Apostolic Chamber in Rome and they received compensation (Pradelli, 1968: 44).  Still, the 
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Since interest rates depended on the particular conditions of purchase, it is 
important to compare like with like or else the analysis is vulnerable to the risk of 
detecting spurious associations between political regimes and cost of public borrowing. 
Regardless of the credibility of the borrower, publicly held debts tended to command 
lower interest rates than short-term loans made by professional money-lenders, as the 
latter were characterised by a high-risk of default, as well as the taint of usury (Munro, 
2003; Drelichman and Voth, 2011). To make an example, in the 1540s the Apostolic 
Chamber of Rome borrowed from private bankers at 12 per cent, at the same time as it 
was issuing annuities at almost half that rate, at 7.5 per cent (Comune di Roma, 1920: 
14, 1925: 14; Bruscoli, 2007: xxiv). Hence, comparing private loans with public securities 
implies a positive bias in the estimated creditworthiness of polities relying on the latter 
only.  
Likewise, although the distinction between voluntary and forced purchases is not 
always clear-cut, it makes sense to compare only annuities voluntarily bought on the 
public market. On the one hand, voluntary purchases implied higher rates of return than 
forced loans, given the need to persuade the buyer of the worth of the investment. On 
the other hand, reputational effects implied the opposite: it was common for payments 
on forced loans to be defaulted and high rates of return were necessary to ensure 
compliance; by contrast, default on voluntary purchases was less likely as it was bound 
to jeopardise future sales (Tracy, 1986: 110).  
In late medieval Italy, this ambivalence was embodied in comparatively low 
official interest rates and particularly high market rates for forced loans. Thus, in 
fourteenth-century Venice the official rate on forced loans was at 5 per cent, half of 
what was paid by Dutch cities on voluntarily bought annuities (losrenten) at the same 
time; and yet this hierarchy was often inverted by market rates: for the fourteenth-
century Venetian securities these reached returns as much as almost five times the 
official rate (Pezzolo, 2005: 154-157; Zuijderduijn 2009: 283-284).  In other words, 
relying on official interest rates on forced loans can be seriously misleading as a guide to 
the creditworthiness of the issuing authority. Indeed market rates, which reflect 
creditworthiness more accurately than official rates can lead one towards an opposite 
conclusion. 
Excluding private and forced loans, however, takes care of only the most obvious 
source of heterogeneity: conditions of purchase varied also within the voluntary market 
for public annuities. Table 1 shows the sources and types of interest rates used in the 
analysis.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
reputation of the local currency was bound to influence the cost of borrowing across states. 
Fortunately, most Italian states in the early modern period, with the notable exception of the 
Tuscan one, where the currency was relatively stable, experienced debasement to a similar extent 
(Cipolla, 2001: 72). Hence, one can afford to neglect this issue in the comparison. A related issue 
is that for regularly defaulting cities the interest rate is a an imperfect measure of the actual cost 
of borrowing; yet, it is sufficient to assume that investors correctly assessed risk and preferred 




The best-known difference is that between life annuities and perpetuities. 
Payments for the former ceased upon the death of the purchaser, whereas with the 
latter they continued in perpetuity. As a result, life annuities commanded a higher 
interest rate; usually, but not always, nearly twice as much (Munro, 2007: 34). Within 
early modern Italy, this issue, however, is not particularly serious. Life annuities (luoghi 
vacabili) were considerably less popular than perpetuities (luoghi non vacabili). In 
addition, more often than not, they were sold at around the same time as perpetuities, 
as, presumably, authorities sought to target different segments of the market. This 
makes it easy to normalise life annuities.  
For example, between 1588 and 1592, Rome issued thirteen annuities, ten of 
which were life annuities. All these were sold at 10 per cent, while the three 
perpetuities were sold at 6.5 per cent in 1589, 1591 and 1592 (Comune di Roma, 1920: 
92-110, 1925: 148-202, 172; Piola Caselli, 1988: 199; Colzi, 1999: 60). The analysis 
treats all these issues as perpetuities sold at 6.5 per cent. Only a handful of tontines, 
age-related or multiple lives annuities were issued in early modern Italy; these have been 
excluded from the analysis. 
Long-term tax alienations, known as arrendamenti at Naples and soggiogazioni at 
Palermo, are potentially more harmful than life annuities for the accuracy of the 
analysis. This type of annuity was popular in the Spanish territories; like standard 
annuities, it entitled the holder to receiving an annual rate of the sum initially paid, but 
involved direct management of the tax revenue. This made default more difficult and 
even created scope for enjoying a greater return than that initially agreed, but, by the 
same token, tax alienations made creditors bear the risk of the tax return not being 
sufficient to cover the agreed rate. For instance, in Naples, the holders of the alienation 
of the duty on brandy at 7 per cent saw their actual return oscillate between 1.36 and 
10.88 per cent in the space of only ten years between 1681 and 1691 (de Rosa, 1958: 
252). In consequence, for example, in sixteenth- and seventeenth-centuries Milan, 
securities sold on the same day often commanded different rates depending on the 
reliability of the particular duty alienated (de Luca, 2007: 134).  
Still, on average assets and liabilities tended to cancel themselves out: the rates 
on tax alienations tended to be the same as for perpetuities. Across Milan, Naples, 
Piedmont and Venice, it was possible to compare sixteen yearly means of rates on tax 
alienations and standard annuities from the same year and place; the majority of times 
the rate was identical; only twice was the difference greater than one percentage point. 
It is therefore legitimate to directly compare tax alienations and perpetuities.  
The same does not hold for term-annuities, which were popular in Venice, 
though. The difference behind a usurious loan and a canonically legitimate annuity lied 
in the condition that only the borrower had a right to redeem the security before the 
term agreed (Munro, 2003). Then as today, other things being equal, a shorter term 
was preferable for the lender than a longer one: it implied greater liquidity and a lower 
risk that the seller exercised the “call option” (i.e. offer the creditor to either accept a 
lower interest rate, or get the capital back), or outright defaulted (Flandreau and Zumer, 
2004: 105-105; Bailey, 2005; Nogués Marco and Vam Malle-Sabouet, 2007).  
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In practice, the length of the term can be neglected for long-term annuities. For 
example, in Venice on the 10th April 1571, the Council of Ten (the magistracy managing 
the Venetian debt at the time) decided to issue annuities returning an 8 per cent interest 
“until the Mint will return the capital” (ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Zecca, r. 3: 108-9); 
effectively, these were perpetuities. On the following 7th of July a new emission was 
approved for 15 or 20 years term annuities; the rate remained at 8 per cent (ASV, 
Consiglio dei Dieci, Zecca, r. 3: 113).  
The situation, however, changes when the term of the annuity is short. For 
example, in 1570, the Venetian Mint sold fifteen years annuities at 8 per cent; at the 
same time, five years annuities regularly commanded  a lower rate,  6 or 7 per cent 
(ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Zecca, r. 3: 90, 93, 95-96, 100). This difference is not 
captured by the internal rate of return often used to compare different types of annuity 
(cf. Weir, 1989; Velde and Weir 1992; Bell and Sutcliffe, 2010). To address this issue, 
following Flandreau and Flores (2009: 658), Venetian annuities with terms less than 10 
years are normalised on the basis of the average ratio between long- and short-term 
annuities in years when both of them were issued.4 
The liquidity and risk premium can be expected to be location-specific, depending 
on how developed the secondary annuity market was, the particular risk of conversion 
and default, or more simply on habit. The deposits of the Monte di Pietà of Florence, 
which represent the last type of annuity used, illustrate this point. This Monte di Pietà 
was founded in 1496 to lend money to the poor; it began accepting deposits at 5 per 
cent in 1533 to finance its operations, thereby relieving the city of Florence from this 
responsibility (Menning, 1993: 140). Helping to meet public expenditures was not the 
only way in which the deposits of the Monte di Pietà were similar to conventional 
annuities: from 1547 Cosimo I began to regularly borrow from the deposited funds at 5 
per cent (Menning, 1993: 179).  
Initially, creditors could withdraw money from the deposits at their will; thus 
these deposits were effectively loans. However, eventually, the usury prohibition began 
to bite; from 1609 restrictions on withdrawals were placed to keep the canonists happy; 
henceforth, creditors had to purchase luoghi di monte, instead of directly depositing 
money. Yet, this change did not result in an increase in the interest rate, which 
remained at 5 per cent (Menning, 1993: 266). The same rate of 5 per cent was paid on 
the first perpetuities issued by the city of Florence in 1599, as well as on the Monte di 
Pietà perpetuities sold in 1616 (ASF, Monte Comune o delle Graticole, parte I, pezzo 3: 
260; Cantini, 1804b: 28; Goldthwaite, 2009: 503).  
                                                 
4 That is 0.79. Although this figure is mainly based on sixteenth-century rates, in practice, the 
normalisation has no bearing on eighteenth-century interest rates, as 10 years term-annuities 
were popular at the time. Moreover, a comparison based on two sixteenth-century and eight 
seventeenth-century life annuities suggests that the risk and liquidity premium did not 
significantly change during this time: on average, in the fifteenth century a life annuity 
commanded a rate 1.75 times greater than a long-term annuity and 2.17 greater than a short-
term annuity; the latter figure for the seventeenth century is 2.15, implying a normalising rate 
between short- and long-term annuities of 0.81. In the neighbouring Verona in the seventeenth 
century the rate between short-term annuities (six months or five years) and longer term 
annuities (twelve years and perpetuities) sold by the local Monte di Pietà also ranged between 
0.75 and 0.8 (cf. Pullan, 1985: 116; Ferlito, 2009: 154-157). 
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.About one third of the interest rate quotations refer to the interest rate paid, 
rather than the interest rate at the time of issue of the annuity. In other words, they 
refer to rates collected either from state balances or from ledgers listing creditors, such 
as those held in the Genoa’s State Archive (cf. e.g. ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, pandetta 
18). On the one hand, a secular tendency towards declining interest rates implies that 
the inclusion of paid rates can introduce a positive bias in the measure of the cost of 
public borrowing. On the other hand, interest rates paid that were significantly greater 
than those that would be offered on new issues triggered reductions through the 
exercise of the call option. Furthermore, about 90 per cent of the paid quotations are 
from Genoa, where the cost of borrowing emerges as being significantly lower than in 
any other place and remarkably stable for over two-thirds of the period covered by the 
data. Hence, while the use of paid rates allows the systematic coverage of periods with 
few new issues, it is not expected to significantly affect the accuracy of the analysis.5 
Instead of relying on the rates paid on the luoghi di S. Giorgio collected by Cuneo 
(1842) and elaborated by Cipolla (1952), as previously done by other studies of the cost 
of the Genoese debt (Braudel, 1987; Homer and Sylla, 2005; Fratianni, 2006; Stasavage, 
2011), this analysis uses only rates paid on the debt directly managed by the Republic.  
In the sixteenth century all the Genoese debt was managed by the consortium of 
creditors, the Casa di S. Giorgio. From the first half of the seventeenth century, 
however, the Republic “came of age” and began to directly issue new annuities, like the 
Monte S. Bernardo perpetuity of 1625 (Felloni, 1998; 2007). Neglecting Cuneo’s (1842) 
figures therefore implies losing out the sixteenth century, but is nevertheless advisable 
for the type of analysis carried out here.  This is partly implied by the focus on political 
regimes, as the sui generis institutional setting found in sixteenth-century Genoa can be 
an important confounding factor. Indeed, Fratianni (2006) traces to this particular 
institutional arrangement, rather than to a republican constitution, the comparatively 
low interest rates paid there.  
More importantly, one cannot exclude that the published S. Giorgio’s figures are 
marred by a significant margin of error. Cipolla (1952: 258) warns that his source “can 
only be trusted so much”, and for the period 1625-1764 the figures collected from 
primary archival sources used here turn out to be on average nearly twice as big as 
those implied by Cuneo’s (1842) data. This is despite the fact that, unlike the return on 
the republican debt, the luoghi di S. Giorgio had a variable interest rate and were paid 
with a delay ranging from a few months to over nine years (Felloni, 2010: 81). Both 
these features make this asset more rather than less risky than the republican securities. 
As stressed also by Homer and Sylla (2005), Cuneo’s (1842) figures are astonishingly 
low, and, pending further research, they should be treated with caution.  
                                                 
5 Another source of noise is taxation. Typically, the urban governments specified that the buyers 
of annuities would enjoy their return exempt from taxes (Felloni, 1971; Pezzolo, 1995: 286-287)-
, “without any retention”, as the Florentine senate boasted in 1726 (ASF, Monte Comune o delle 
Graticole, parte I, pezzo 4: 7). Nonetheless, there were some exceptions to this rule. For instance, 
Genoa in 1769 retained 10 per cent of the return on the Primo Impiego, implying an effective 
return of 2.025 per cent instead of 2.25 per cent (Banco di S. Giorgio, pandetta 18, numero 
610/2478). Regarding this issue, here it is assumed that unless otherwise specified, the return 
was free of tax. 
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As only little information is available on market annuity prices in early modern 
Italy, it is not possible to systematically control for discount rates applied to new issues 
to reflect a changing risk premium (cf. Sussman and Yafeh, 2006: 917). Nonetheless, 
both European and Italian data suggest that within an open market the use of official 
rates is not as problematic as for forced loans. Reliance on official rates implies a 
narrowing down of differences across states, rather than causing a change in the 
interest rates hierarchy: in an open market risky assets were bound to command 
comparatively high rates both officially and effectively.  
Thus, in eighteenth-century Britain, where payments were regularly honoured 
and official and market rates can be systematically compared, these were mostly 
identical and only very occasionally did they exhibit significant differences (Sussman and 
Yafeh, 2006: 909). By contrast, in France between 1672 and 1710, significant gaps 
between market and official rates opened up at times of war, when the monarchy 
sought to conceal fiscal difficulties (Béguin, 2012: 247). Similarly, in Spain, a series of 
defaults implied that in the later sixteenth century the gap between official and market 
rates of juros issued by the crown suddenly and significantly widened (Grafe, 2012: 15).  
Turning to Italy, at Rome, despite pronounced short-term fluctuations, the 
secondary market price of Papal annuities between 1577 and 1611 was on average only 
eight per cent points above par (Colzi, 1999: 116; Pezzolo, 1999: 239-240). In fact, 
such rates understated the actual cost of borrowing for the public coffers: new annuity 
issues were sold at below par to bankers, who sold them at above par on the secondary 
market (Piola Caselli, 2012: 292). Still, they suggest that in Rome official rates can be 
considered as a reliable guide of effective rates. Likewise, at Florence, with remarkably 
little foresight and in apparent disregard of what was taking place beyond the Alps, 
between 1793 and 1796 the Monte Comune investors bought perpetuities in the 
secondary market at the following average rates of their official value: 99 per cent, 98¼ 
per cent, 97½ per cent and 97¼ (ASF, Nuovo Monte Comune, Pezzo 383).6  
In contrast, at Palermo and Naples, where, as seen later (cf. section 4), official 
rates tended to be considerably higher than at Rome and Florence, gaps between 
official and market rates could be significant indeed. For example, in late sixteenth-
century Palermo government securities were traded at thirty to forty per cent of par 
(Koenisberger, 1969: 134). Likewise at Naples, in April 1678, tax alienations had to be 
sold at 38 per cent of par to find buyers, implying an effective return of over 20 per cent 
instead of the official rate of 7 per cent (Bulgarelli Lukacs, 1993: 49-50).  
The birth of the Italian primary market for public annuities is usually dated to the 
1520s (Pezzolo, 1995; Munro, 2003). There are examples of voluntarily-funded public 
debt in Italy from the fifteenth century, such as the seven per cent dowry fund 
established by Florence in 1425, and the annuities issued by the city of Ancona in 1454 
at 5 per cent (Kirshner and Molho, 1978; Palermo, 2007); the Monti di Pietà of Pistoia 
and Vicenza also accepted paid deposits as early as 1475 at 7.5 per cent and 1493 at 4 
per cent, respectively (Capecchi and Gai, 1976: 73; Pulin, 1986: 113).  
                                                 
6 The interest rates implied by these four figures have been included in the dataset. 
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But these remained isolated instances.  The earliest record of a sale of a 
perpetuity aimed at financing deficit spending by the Kingdom of Naples dates back to 
1520; its interest rate was probably 10 per cent, although it may have been higher 
(Calabria, 1991: 104; 143-145). Amidst difficulties with raising further funds through 
the sale of offices, the Papacy began issuing perpetuities at a 10 per cent yearly interest 
in 1526 (Piola Caselli, 2003; Carboni, 2009). Two years later the Venetian mint accepted 
voluntary subscriptions to deposits with a yearly interest of 16 per cent; 1528 is thus 
seen as marking a break with the republican tradition of relying on forced loans to fund 
wars and other public expenditures (Pezzolo, 1995, 2003a; Munro, 2003).7  
Hence, both data availability and historical reality make the 1520s the natural 
starting point. To keep the task manageable, the analysis ends in 1796, when a young 
Napoleon made a name of himself by leading the Italian campaigns, radically altering 
the political landscape of the peninsula and beyond in the process. Figure 1 shows the 
geographical distribution of the observations. 
Although, unavoidably, the coverage is uneven, the dataset is sufficient for the 
econometric analysis of the determinant of the cost of public borrowing across eight 
major Italian regional states spread across the peninsula.8 Even if, as highlighted above, 
it was not possible to eliminate all sources of noise, the exclusion of private and forced 
loans and the normalisation to perpetuity of other assets render the comparison 
between early modern Italian interest rates comparatively accurate. Having presented 
the dependent variable, the next section turns to the independent ones. 
 
3. Political regimes, war and financial development 
The controls used in the panel data regression analysis of the determinant of the 
cost of public borrowing together with their expected sign from a neo-institutional 
perspective are summarised by table 2. The characterisation of political regimes can be 
grouped under three headings: constitutional representation, fiscal centralisation and 
                                                 
7 In fact, both the unusually high interest rate for what was effectively a four months term 
annuity and the language of the edict, suggest that the 1528 Venetian issue was at least partly 
forced: “summon … all the inhabitants … demand them to lend money, gold and silver for the 
greatest sum that each of them can” (Reale Commissione, 1903a: 211). Compare this with, for 
example, the language used for the life annuities sold by the Venetian mint in 1538: “we 
propose … to accept in deposit for life … declaring that all who … deposit … shall have … 14 p 
co … all … life” (ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Comune, r. 12, p. 152) (for this reason the interest rate 
of this particular short-term annuity has not been normalised). Still, according to documents held 
by the Venetian archive, the local mint was accepting deposits on twenty years term annuities at 
8 per cent already in 1524. Thus, in February 1544 the Council of Ten noted that: “On the XI of 
the month of next June will end the XX years for which was alienated the duty of the depositors 
at 8 per co” (ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Zecca, r. 1: 79-80); analogous remarks were made in May, 
June, and August 1544 in relation to twenty years deposits at 8 per cent coming to maturity in 
July, August and September 1544 (ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Zecca, r. 1: 85, 87, 90).  
 
8 Since unbalanced panels imply biased estimates of the standard errors (Baltagi, 1995: 151), like 
that of Stasavage (2011), the analysis is based on decadal, rather than yearly means. As annuity 
issues tend to be clustered in certain years, to limit over-representation of these years, decadal 
means are computed on the basis of yearly means. 
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jurisdictional fragmentation. The three remaining independent variables control for war 
pressure and financial development. 
 
Constitutional representation 
In the early modern period little was left of the communal liberty that 
characterised the city-states of central and northern Italy in the high middle-ages. By 
1555, when the Republic of Siena had fallen prey to the Duchy of Tuscany, Venice, 
Genoa and Lucca were the only surviving republics of the peninsula. The Venetian 
constitution placed sovereignty in the Great Council, which was formed by all adult 
male nobles residing in Venice; the magistracies responsible for day-to-day 
administration, like the Senate and the Council of Ten, were elected by and accountable 
to it (Lane, 1973a). Similarly, in Genoa the 1528 oligarchic constitution prescribed that 
magistracies and officials were accountable to the Major and the Minor Councils, whose 
members, in turn, were randomly drawn from the local aristocracy (Constantini, 1997: 
23). In short, the Venetians and Genoese constitutions ticked all the boxes of 
Stasavage’s (2011: 54-69) taxonomy: fiscal decisions were taken by bodies representing 
geographically concentrated urban patricians.   
As well as communal liberties, the high middle-ages had also seen the flourishing 
of representative parliaments in feudal territories, like Piedmont, Sardinia, Sicily and 
Naples. Only a few of these parliaments survived into the early modern era, though: the 
Piedmontese estates met for the last time in 1560; thereafter, within our sample, only 
the Neapolitan and the Sicilian parliaments continued to play an important role 
(Marongiu, 1962; Koenigsberger, 1986).  The constituencies represented in these Italian 
parliaments were both socially and geographically wider than that of early modern 
republican institutions, but their representation was less intensive than that enjoyed by 
republican oligarchs.  
Thus, the Neapolitan parliament regularly met every three years or so until 1642 
when it was dissolved; it had representatives of the towns and the feudal lords, but, 
peculiarly, not the clergy. Although ultimately sovereignty lied with the Spanish crown, 
the Neapolitan parliament was consulted over taxation, and at times it successfully 
resisted fiscal demands from Madrid (Koenigsberger, 1986: 44-46). The Sicilian 
parliaments were probably the earliest secular assemblies in Europe. Their members 
were drawn from the three estates (nobility, clergy and cities) and had powers on 
taxation, legislation and war. Similarly to its Neapolitan counterpart, in the sixteenth 
century the Sicilian parliament was summoned every three years to vote donatives (tax), 
and occasionally for exceptional taxes. It met only once under Savoyard rule, but was 
revived under the Habsburgs and the Bourbons (Koenigsberger, 1986: 37-44).   
The only elective Italian principality was, of course, the Papacy. However, after 
more than a century of declining influence, by the later sixteenth century the College of 
Cardinals had lost any power to constitutionally limit the actions of the Pope, to become 
only an elective body and an instrument of papal absolutism (Prodi, 1968: ch. 4). In this 
latter respect, it was similar to the Florentine, Piedmontese, Mantuan and Milanese 
senates. These institutions were modelled after medieval parliaments and republican 
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councils: they were meant to act as constitutional restraints to the authority of the 
prince (Symcox, 1983: 55; Sella and Capra, 1984: 37; Litchfield, 1986: 67-68; 
Carpanetto and Ricuperati, 1987: 59).  
Yet, despite the early modern constitutionalists’ best intentions, appointment by 
the prince of a carefully selected few, even when mitigated by institutions like the life 
appointment of the Florentine senators (Litchfield, 1986: 67-68), unavoidably restricted 
the scope for resisting his authority. Thus, by 1723, it had become so clear that the 
Piedmontese senate had been transformed into a clog in Victor Amedeus II’s 
government machine that it was also formally stripped of its traditional prerogative of 
approving royal legislation, what was known as interinazione in the legal jargon of the 
time (Quazza, 1957: 78-79; Symcox, 1983: 58). 
 
Fiscal centralisation 
Turning to fiscal centralisation, applying Dincecco’s (2009a, 2009b, 2011) 
yardstick, a uniform tax-rate within the state, is not a viable option in early modern Italy. 
Old regime Italian regional states were characterised by fiscal fragmentation and a 
resilient web of urban, clerical and feudal fiscal jurisdictions; these autonomies were 
finally eroded only by the Napoleonic reform of 1800, after the end of the period 
analysed (Fasano Guarini, 1995; Dincecco, 2009b: 82).  
Nonetheless, the “fiscal state” (Bonney, 2004) had been a long time in the 
making, and the process developed unevenly across polities. Of key importance here is 
Enrico Stumpo’s (1979, 1984) study of the early origin of a fiscal centralization in 
Piedmont:  in sixteenth-century Italy, he stresses, it was only in Piedmont, the Papacy, 
and the Kingdom of Naples that there existed an institution responsible for compiling an 
annual budget and coordinating the various tax flows: the Camera dei Conti at Turin 
(founded in 1555), the Apostolic Chamber at Rome (dating back to the high middle 
ages) and the Sommaria at Naples (founded in 1444). In contrast, the Venetian and 
Genoese Republics, but also the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and, to a lesser extent, the 
Duchy of Milan and the Kingdom of Sicily were characterised by multiple and 
overlapping fiscal agencies only loosely coordinated (Sella and Capra, 1984; Stumpo, 
1984; Giarizzo and D'Alessandro, 1989: 206-207; Felloni, 1998; Pezzolo, 2003b).  
By the second half of the eighteenth century, the failure to reform meant that an 
obvious gap in fiscal capacity had opened up between the Republics and the 
principalities that had developed centralised fiscal systems (Capra, 2002, 2004; Pezzolo, 
2012). In the “century of the enlightenment”, major processes of rationalisation of the 
fiscal administration were carried out in some regional states, but notably not in the 
Republics. The most far-reaching fiscal reforms were implemented by Victor Amedeus II 
in 1717. The Council of Finance was given systematic oversight of the whole fiscal 
organization of Piedmont and the other territories of the kingdom, thus creating the 
conditions for significantly eroding long-standing areas of fiscal privilege and eliminating 
waste (Quazza, 1957; Symcox, 1983; Capra, 2002, 2004).  Within eighteenth-century 
Italy, only the Lorena’s reforms from 1737 in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and 
Pallavicino’s reforms of 1749 in the Duchy of Milan had a comparable scope (Sella and 
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Capra, 1984: 272-273, 285; Carpanetto and Ricuperati, 1987; Capra, 2002, 2004). In 
consequence, in the aftermath of the reforms, Piedmont and Milan could muster a fiscal 
pressure similar to that of Britain, which was by a long shot the highest in Europe, and 
over twice as high as in the Republic of Venice (Grafe, 2012: 8-9; Pezzolo, 2012: 283). 
 
Jurisdictional fragmentation 
The debate over feudalism in early modern Italy has been dominated by the 
question of “refeudalisation”. The current consensus is that there was continuity amidst 
change, with feudal lords continuing to enjoy significant jurisdictional and fiscal 
autonomies, particularly in the south; the sale of fiefs in principalities during the 
sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries was of relatively little practical significance, as it 
resulted in more feudal lords dividing up a more or less constant pie, so to speak (Fasoli, 
1973; Chittolini, 1986; Muto, 1986; Ago, 1994; Sella, 1997).  
Such claims are corroborated by Sicilian official statistics on the share of the 
population under feudal rule (Ligresti, 2002: 61),9 the measure of the significance of 
feudalism employed here. These data show that the proportion of the population under 
feudal rule declined from 57.3 per cent in 1505 to 44.9 per cent in 1593, to rise 
thereafter; however, by 1806 it was only 4 percentage points greater than at the 
beginning of the period. Elsewhere frequent snapshots are hard to come by, but the 
Sicilian pattern suggests that the available data can be considered as representative of 
the significance of feudalism for the early modern period as a whole for the purposes of 
the analysis.  
This is particularly so as the cross-sectional variation of the proportion of the 
population under feudal rule, unlike its temporal variation within Sicily, was huge. In the 
Granduchy of Tuscany in 1640 only 4 per cent of the population was under feudal rule 
(Chittolini, 1986: 17; Vivoli, 1994: 339). In all likelihood the significance of feudalism 
was lower still in the republics, which, as implied earlier, did not participate in the sale 
of fiefs; there small, at times tiny, fiefs were found only in certain areas, like Friuli in the 
Venetian Terraferma, and alongside the Ligurian Appenines, close to the northern 
border of the Republic of Genoa (Vitale, 1955; Muto, 1986: 37; Pezzolo, 2012: 272).10  
At the other end of the spectrum, in the Kingdom of Naples in 1796 over 70 per 
cent of the population was ruled by feudal lords (Berengo, 1971: 30-1). Though less 
powerful, feudalism was widespread also in the Duchy of Milan, where in seventeenth 
century about half of the population was under feudal jurisdiction (Sella, 1997: 65). 
Despite being usually characterised as a feudal land, at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century the proportion of the Piedmont’s territory classified as feudal for the purposes 
of taxation, 7 per cent, was relatively low (Einaudi, 1908: 66). A similar statistic shows 
that in the Papacy in 1704-1706 36 per cent of the communities in which the state was 
divided for fiscal purposes were feudal (Caravale and Caracciolo, 1978: 443). This figure 
                                                 
9 Specifically the data refer to 1505, 1548, 1570, 1593, 1616, 1623, 1636, 1651, 1681, 1714, 
1747 and 1806. 
10 In the absence of detailed information, here it is assumed that the in the Republics the share of 
the population under feudal rule was half that of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany.  
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is in line with other estimates of the feudal population there (Chittolini, 1986: 18; Sella, 
1997: 65). 
After the Counter Reformation, church-state relationships in seventeenth- and, 
especially, eighteenth-centuries Italy were characterised by a progressive decline in the 
extent to which the Pope challenged secular supremacy in the legal realm (Prodi, 2000). 
Secularisation was the one field where enlightened despotism made relatively significant 
progress, as manifested, for instance, in educational reforms (Carpanetto and 
Ricuperati, 1987). Yet in this as in other areas, the terms of the “throne-altar alliance” 
were renegotiated, rather than being outright challenged, and it is unlikely that 
differences in the influence of Rome across regional states were significantly altered by 
such dynamics.  
To measure these differences, the analysis employs the number of dioceses per 
million of inhabitants in c. 1700.11 These are in remarkable agreement with the 
qualitative evidence. Thus, the lowest figure, 9, is found in the Republic Venice, where 
the clergy had little fiscal exemptions and was strongly subordinated to secular 
authorities (Lane, 1973a; Sella, 1997: 166). This can only be partly traced to a 
republican constitution: in the Republic of Genoa, where loyalty to the Pope was 
consistently upheld, and the bishops enjoyed ample powers and privileges (Ruffini, 
1974: 257-261; Sella, 1997: 165), the figure, 14, is significantly higher than in the 
Republic of Venice. In Tuscany, the Medici’s close family ties with the Papacy implied 
strong links with Rome (Sella, 1997: 165); consistently, the figure is higher still: 23. By 
contrast, in Piedmont where Gallicanism created scope for asserting secular supremacy 
(Sella, 1997: 166), the figure is relatively low: 12.  
With the obvious exception of the Papacy, where the clergy provided a blueprint 
for bureaucratic absolutism (Prodi, 1968, 1987),12 the Kingdom of Naples is usually seen 
as the regional state where the Church wielded the greatest influence (Sella, 1997: 
171). This is confirmed by the figure there, which being 44 is significantly higher than 
anywhere else in the peninsula. One should be wary of generalising to the Spanish 
territories: the figure was not as high in Sicily (22), and was considerably lower in the 
Duchy of Milan (11), where the Spanish monarchy was in a much stronger position vis-
à-vis the church than in the Kingdom of Naples (Sella, 1997: 174).  
 
War pressure 
Notoriously, financing wars was one of the main objectives of public debts; at the 
same time as the exigencies of war created sudden and inelastic demands of funds, the 
uncertainty of the outcome was bound to increase the risk of default. The suddenness 
implied by the concept of a “military revolution” (Parker, 1996) has recently underwent 
criticism; still, there is no denying that in Italy as elsewhere the use of gunpowder, the 
drill and discipline of troops and the growing sizes of armies meant that the scale of 
military conflicts during the early modern period significantly increased (Pezzolo, 2006a).  
                                                 
11 Sources: dioceses: Hanlon (2000: 109-110); population: Cipolla (1965); Bellettini (1987); Felloni 
(1998); Ligresti (2002). 
12 For this reason the value of Church is set to 0 in Rome. 
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To take into account such developments the cliometric literature relies on the 
casualty figures published by Clodfelter (2008), offering two distinct approaches. 
Dincecco (2009b) controls for estimated number of deaths in conflict year and 
populations of the opponents. Karaman and Pamuk (2011) develop an index of war 
pressure which increases with the number of casualties and populations of the 
adversaries weighted by distance relative to the populations involved. On the one hand, 
the latter approach has the merits of parsimony and relevance, since it controls for the 
size of the allied forces and the distance from the “centre of gravity” of the conflict. 
Thus, one can expect the pressure on the Republic of Venice resulting from the War of 
Cyprus to be significantly higher before it was joined by the Holy League; similarly, the 
Thirty Years War should cause significantly more pressure on the Duchy of Milan than 
on the Kingdom of Sicily.  
On the other hand, both approaches suffer from the drawback that later conflicts 
are much better documented, with the result that comparable casualty figures for all of 
the early modern wars are not available. Simply adding the documented deaths or 
casualties is bound to significantly bias the pressure resulting from earlier conflicts 
downwards. In addition, the different elements of Karaman and Pamuk’s (2011) index 
are measured in different units. Hence, two corrections are implemented here. Firstly, to 
take into account developments in military technology the analysis relies on the average 
number of casualties per battle, instead of total casualties per capita per war-year.13 
Secondly, the three remaining elements of the index, that is average number of 
casualties per battle, sum of the populations of the opponents weighted by distance, 
and the total population involved in the conflict, are normalised to take values between 
0 and 1 before, instead of after, they are multiplied.14  
The use of decadal means ensures that one controls for the greater pressure on 
the public purse caused by longer wars. Although, needless to say, uncertainty about 
the underlying figures implies that, unavoidably, the index is bound to suffer from 
significant margins of error, the results of the estimation exercise turn out to be 
eminently plausible. On average, the pressure resulting from a year of war is estimated 
as increasing by about 1.2 times between the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, 
and by about 1.5 times between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries. 
Reassuringly, these figures are in the same order of magnitude as changes in the 
number of casualties per battle, as well as in the size of Italian armies during the 
“military revolution” (cf. Pezzolo, 2006a). Within the sample, the highest average war 
pressure was by far that experienced by the Duchy of Milan (0.18) and Piedmont (0.16), 
whereas the same value is particularly low for the Republic of Genoa (0.02) and Tuscany 
(0.01). Again these figures agree with expectations. Hence, all in all, this index seems to 
offer substantial advantages as compared to the use of war-years. 
  
                                                 
13 An average of 9 battles per war is considered. 
14 Sources: casualties: Clodfelter (2008); population: Cipolla (1965); Helleiner (1967); Symcox 
(1983); McEvedy and Jones (1985); Bellettini (1987); Braudel (1987); Felloni (1998); Corritore 




The best available measure of commercial and financial development (and hence 
supply of capital) before the nineteenth century is urbanisation (Persson, 1988). In the 
Italian context, although state-level population data are available, perhaps even more 
than elsewhere in Europe they are bound to be marred by significant measurement 
errors; given the choice it is therefore preferable to work with city-level data only. This 
makes sense also because it looks as if residents of the city rather than of the state were 
the main purchasers of urban annuities.15 Thus, as late as 1726, about 68 per cent of 
the Florentine debt was in the hands of Florentine creditors, while only about 13 per 
cent of it was held by other Tuscan residents (Stumpo, 2007: 149). Similarly, the 
Venetian patricians and Venetian religious institutions at around 1673 accounted for 
about 60 per cent of the holders of the annuity issued the previous year, as compared 
to less than 6 per cent of it being held by subjects of the Terraferma (Felloni, 1971: 
145).  
The standard city-level measure of urbanisation is the so-called “urban potential”. 
This measure is equal to the sum of the local and other cities’ populations weighted by 
distance; in turn, distances are weighted to take into account whether cities were 
connected by sea-, river-, or road-transport (de Vries, 1984; Bosker et al. 2008). In 
addition, to take into account that commercial and capital flows were bound to be 
hindered by state borders, an additional weight of 1.25 is imposed on the distance 
between cities in different states.16  
Typically, foreign investment was explicitly endorsed by the urban authorities. For 
instance, on the 14th of March 1599, the Florentine senate declared that: the “buyers … 
can be … subjects as well as foreigners … of whatever fate, grade or condition” (ASF, 
Monte Comune o delle Graticole, parte I, pezzo 3: 261). However, foreign investors 
faced a higher risk than locals due to exchange rate fluctuations, and, probably more 
importantly, the habit of being discriminated against in case of defaults. To make one 
illustrative example, in 1640 Naples did not pay any interest on the perpetuities held by 
foreigners, while the locals were paid two thirds of the sums due (Calabria, 1991: 128). 
In the Italian context, the use of urban potential is made complicated by the fact 
that many towns in the south were in fact “agro-towns”, with the majority of 
population employed in agriculture. In consequence, in southern areas urbanisation is a 
poor proxy of commercial and financial development. This feature vitiates direct cross-
sectional comparison across northern and southern areas (Malanima, 2005a). To 
mitigate this issue, following Bosker et al. (2008), the analysis only consider cities with at 
least 10,000 inhabitants, instead of 5,000 as in de Vries (1984). In addition, the 
quantitative analysis is based on within-city variations only. 
Like Bosker et al. (2008), in the economy of the work, only the populations of 
Italian cities are included (drawn from Malanima, 2005b). This implies an only little loss 
                                                 
15 The prevalence of investors from the city also implies that it makes sense, as Bosker et al. 
(2008) also suggest, to not weighting the local population when computing the urban potential 
measure. 
16 Like the other weights, this particular weight is arbitrary. Nonetheless, it has the desirable 
property of preserving the ratio between the highest and lowest weight at 2. 
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of accuracy: investments from beyond the Alps were relatively rare. There were 
exceptions; for instance, in the 1560s Venice attracted substantial funds from Geneva 
(Pezzolo, 1995: 287) and the 1570 Venetian issue was specifically aimed at German 
investors: “Having understood that some Germans would deposit … in the mint … a 
good sum of money … let … [the mint] accept … talers from those who wish” (ASV, 
Consiglio dei Dieci, Zecca, r. 3: 95). However, most investors were from the peninsula, 
with the Genoese being particularly active from the beginning of the seventeenth 
century (Felloni, 1971, 1998, 2007). Thus, despite the transnational nature of the 
Papacy’s financial links, in 1684-1689 less than 4 per cent of the investors in the Monte 
di San Pietro came from outside Italy (Masini, 2007: 205).  
Time is a residual variable capturing other factors behind an obvious long-term 
decline in the interest rates in the course of the early modern era. At the time the Italian 
economy was stagnating (Malanima, 2010), and, likely enough, increases in the demand 
and supply of capital due to population growth offset one another. Hence, the decline 
was probably mainly due to decreases in the cost of financial transactions. This, in turn, 
can be traced to such factors as the development of secondary markets for annuities, 
the growth of networks of financial intermediaries, the expansion of credit facilities, and 
rising financial literacy.17 A detailed investigation of the role of these institutions is a task 
for further research; the next section begins presenting the results of this one, by taking 
a glance at the interest rates data. 
 
4. A glance at the data 
Figure 2 shows the decadal means of perpetuity normalised nominal interest in 
the sample. The continuous line is the average in log-scale; its values are shown on the 
y-axis at right hand side. The trend of this line is the yearly rate of change; this takes 
into account that as interest rates become lower progress becomes more difficult.18  
The figure shows an evident and widespread long-term trend towards falling 
nominal interest rates;19 in fact, that the cost of capital tended to fall more or less 
                                                 
17 Felloni’s (1971: 81-101) overview of the early modern Italian annuity secondary market remains 
unsurpassed. As in all the cities in the sample there were public banks from the sixteenth century 
(De Marco, 1988; Felloni, 2008), a dummy variable for this institution is ill-suited to explain cross-
sectional variation. Equally, using presence of a university as a proxy for human capital was 
considered, but decided against in the light of the poor correspondence between presence of a 
university and schooling enrolments that can be observed. Thus, by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, when enrolment statistics become available, elementary schooling was much 
more widespread in Lombardy than in any other Italian region but Veneto, whilst there was no 
university at Milan and Venice; by contrast, Naples and especially Turin lagged behind despite the 
fact that universities were founded there as early as 1224 and 1404, respectively (cf. Davies, 
1997: 1248; Chilosi, 2007: 419-421). 
18 For the same reason, the log of interest rates is taken also in the panel data analysis. 
19 The real interest rate can be estimated as the average nominal rate minus the average rate of 
inflation in a given decade, as yearly price indexes are available for central and northern Italy 
(Malanima, 2010).  The “price revolution” (c. 1550-1650) implies that the fall in real interest is 
slower than that in nominal ones, with a yearly rate of change of -0.0017 as compared to -
0.0038. Moreover, price fluctuations imply that the fall is not as consistent: the coefficient is not 
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continuously in the early modern period is well-known (Homer and Sylla, 2005). Still, 
clearly, there were marked variations across regional states. In particular, the 
comparatively high rates in the Spanish territories and the singularly low ones paid at 
Genoa stand out. Eye-balling is confirmed by formal analysis. Without loss of generality, 
table 3 compares nominal interest rates in Italian cities with those in Rome, while 
controlling for the secular decline in the variable. To facilitate interpretation, the second 
column shows the marginal effects implied by the coefficients for the sample average.  
The marginal effects show that, for instance, on average the spread between 
annuities sold in the same decade at Milan and Rome was 1.595, while that between 
Genoa and Venice was 2.816. It is easy to associate comparatively high interest rates in 
the Spanish territories to a high risk of default. Thus, at Milan, during the period under 
analysis partial or total defaults are documented in 69 years; otherwise put, the city 
defaulted at least every four years or so (Pugliese, 1924: 339-376; Felloni, 1971: 304). 
The marginal effects also signal that at Venice interest rates were significantly higher 
than at Florence and Rome, and nowhere near the Genoese levels. The striking contrast 
between the two republics of Genoa and Venice is puzzling from a neo-institutional 
perspective and warrants detailed comparison.  
The Genoese series shows that at the beginning of the seventeenth century the 
cost of the republican debt was still in line with that of other Italian states. It is only 
between the 1620s and the 1670s that a significant gap developed. It follows that 
particularly low interest rates at Genoa were not simply the legacy of its pioneering role 
in the development of financial services in the high and late middle-ages (Felloni and 
Laura, 2004). Beside, Genoa shared this feature with Venice and to a lesser extent 
Florence (Fratianni and Spinelli, 2006). Indeed, until the fifteenth century Venice was the 
leading financial market not only in Italy but in Southern Europe as a whole (Spufford, 
2006), and hence was comparatively well-endowed with financial services at the 
beginning of the period under analysis. Similar remarks apply to the role of credit 
facilities developed during the “century of the Genoese” (1527-1627), when local 
capitalists pulled the strings of European credit transactions (Braudel, 1987: 157): it is 
only in its aftermath that interest rates became very low. All in all, financial development 
does not take one very far.  
The perspective that the attractiveness of private investment contributed to 
keeping interest rates high at Venice has a certain plausibility for the sixteenth century, 
when increases in industrial production made up for shrinking international trade: at the 
time, the interest on private loans was about two percentage points higher than that on 
the Venetian debt (Pezzolo, 2003c: 15). However, the argument has less force from the 
seventeenth century onwards. The Republic of Venice was hit hard by the seventeenth-
century crises: telling in this respect is the case of wool-cloths, the production of which 
fell by 90 per cent between 1611-1615 and 1721-1723 (Pezzolo, 2003b: 167). At the 
same time, figures from the area around Bergamo suggest that returns from rural 
investments were significantly falling, too, and remained well-below of those enjoyed by 
the creditors of the Republic: on average in the seventeenth century the spread was 
                                                                                                                                            
significant at the 10 per cent level for real interest rates, while it is significant at the 1 per cent 
level for nominal interest rates. 
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about 2 percentage points. Analogous remarks apply to data from the silk industry at 
the same time (Pezzolo, 1995: 310-311).  
If the seventeenth-century crises contributed to making the Genoese debt an 
obvious target for employing capitals, thus depressing local interest rates (Felloni, 2007: 
147), economic recession was hardly limited to the Republic of Genoa. Despite its fading 
fortunes, the Republic of Genoa remained one of the most commercially advanced 
states of the peninsula, and interest rates remained comparatively low in the eighteenth 
century, too, when commerce at the port revived (Malanima, 2002: 184, 342-346). At 
the same time, Genoese financiers were lending money to foreign private investors at 
consistently and significantly higher rates than those commanded by the local 
republican debt (cf. Felloni, 1971: 523-650).   
Moreover, if it were private investment that was crowding-out investment in 
public securities and driving the Venetian interest rates up, one should observe equally 
high yields elsewhere in the Republic. As it happens, between the mid-sixteenth and the 
mid-seventeenth centuries interest rates paid on the deposits of the Monte di Pietà of 
Bergamo, Brescia, Udine and Verona were on average 1.32 percentage points lower 
than those paid on the Venetian public debt.20 In sharp contrast, in the Republic of 
Genoa, at Savona in 1749 and 1766 the yield on the local debt was almost twice as 
high as that of Genoa.21  
While Cipolla (1952) argues that Genoese interest rates suddenly dropped as a 
result of inflows of American silver from Spain from the later sixteenth century, the 
figures presented here detect decline only somewhat later. Moreover, as stressed by 
Fratianni (2006), a sudden capital inflow should only temporarily lower interest rates, 
and institutional explanations have greater explanatory power in relation to persistently 
                                                 
20 Sources: Bergamo: Pulin (1985: 122); Brescia: Montanari (2001: 103); Udine: Tagliaferri (1969: 
169, 180-181); Venice: see the appendix; Verona: Ferlito (2009: 154-157); Pulin (1985: 166).  
21 The spread observed within the Republic of Venice was high also compared to those found in 
other regional states. Even in the Duchy of Milan, where, as seen earlier, the capital serially 
defaulted, in the seventeenth century the cost of provincial debt was on average only 0.74 
percentage points lower than that of the state debt. This difference, being at 0.52, was lower 
still in the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. In the 
Savoyard State perpetuities sold at Casale Monferrato in 1731, at Chambery in 1735, at Cuneo 
in 1706 and 1745, and at Nice in 1623 had the same rate as those sold at Turin at the same 
times. In fact, 1622 data from Caramagna and Pinerolo, where the rate was 1 percentage point 
greater than at Turin in 1627, suggest that the weak position of small communities vis-à-vis 
creditors could imply higher interest rates than in the capital. Similarly, in the Papacy, at Finale 
Emilia between 1617 and 1639 the cost of the debt was on average 2.53 percentage points 
higher than at Rome; by contrast, the rate at Bologna between 1516 and 1754 was 0.42 
percentage points lower than at Rome, while that at Ferrara between 1630 and 1753 was only 
0.25 percentage points higher. Sources: Republic of Genoa: Genoa: see the appendix; Savona: 
Felloni (1971: 110, 2007: 137); Duchy of Milan: Como: Caizzi (1955: 50); Cremona: Jacopetti 
(1961: 44-46); Milan: see the appendix; Vigevano: Caizzi (1955: 371-371); Granduchy of 
Tuscany: Florence: see the appendix; Pisa: Bernardini (1974: Appendix); Berti (1988: 316); Siena: 
Mengozzi (1913: 280). Savoyard State: Caramagna: Abrate (1985: 47); Casale Monferrato: 
Duboin (1818-1868a: 303); Cuneo: Einaudi (1908: 201); Duboin (1818-1868c: 404-407, 531, 
557); Chambery: Duboin (1818-1868a: p. 292-301); Duboin (1818-1868b: p. 1335); Nice: 
Duboin (1818-1868a: 292); Pinerolo: Abrate (1985: 47); Turin: see the appendix; Papacy: 
Bologna: Vietti (1884: 137); Nanni (1968); Pradelli (1968); Felloni (1971: 182); Ferrara: Vietti 
(1884: 143, 149); Felloni (1971: 194-195); Finale Emilia: Cattini (1988: 200); Rome: see the 
appendix. 
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low levels. However, the evidence is that Fratianni (2006) overstates the importance of 
the Casa di S. Giorgio: the debt directly managed by the Republic exhibited very low 
interest rates, too.  Indeed, the fall in interest rates was correlated with the growth of 
the republican debt.  
Furthermore, it looks as if oligarchic control over the debt was an effective means 
of limiting the risk of default at Venice, too. Delays of payments at times of financial 
difficulties due to the cost of neutrality between 1700 and 1714 and a partial default in 
1767 (Felloni, 1971: 139, 141) are possibly the only documented cases of public default 
on voluntary annuities in the Republic of Venice in the early modern years. As a rule the 
Republic of Venice could credibly commit to repay its dues. So much so that when in 
1577 the Senator Zuan Francesco Priuli persuaded the Venetian Senate to extinguish the 
public debt to fight parasitism and stimulate productive investments, in a matter of 
seven years creditors were returned every ducat they had invested (Pezzolo, 1995: 288, 
2003b: 90-97).  
Instead than to risk, relatively high interest rates in Venice can be traced to the 
vested interest of the local oligarchs in receiving returns above the cost minimising level. 
This incentive is neatly captured by Frèdèric Lane (1973b: 315): “the well-to-do paid less 
in taxes than they were paid in interest and redemption of the principal … its rulers 
work[ed] out a system of loans and taxes which tended to reinforce the wealth of the 
rich”.  Returns above the cost-minimising level should imply an excess of demand for 
the Venetian bonds. Although prices on the secondary market are not available, 
corroborating evidence come from the Venetian edicts. In Luciano Pezzolo’s (1995: 309) 
words: “skimming through the issuing edicts of the deposits in the Venetian mint one 
gets the impression … that the response to the demand of public credit was swift, and 
that at times the emissions were the results of the needs of the investors … for example 
… an issue of 200000 ducats … in 1639 … was sold out within only six days”.    
To make another example, on the 28th July 1570, the Council of Ten deliberated 
that: “[s]eeing that a lot of particulars of this city readily compete to deposit money in 
the mint at 7 per cent and having already collected all the one-hundred thousand 
ducats from the last issue on the 20th of June … and even some more money than that 
… let … the mint accept one-hundred thousand ducats more at 7 per cent per year 
with the same conditions” (ASV, Consiglio dei Dieci, Zecca, r. 2: 96). In other words, this 
instance illustrates, when the demand exceeded the supply the magistracy did not 
respond by lowering interest rates on existing issues, as a cost-minimiser agent would 
do, but by selling more issues at the same rate.22 
Naturally, regressive distribution through the public debt was favoured by 
Venice’s republican oligarchic constitution and, related to this, its heavy reliance on 
                                                 
22 Although this strategy may be a rational from a cost-minimising perspective if drops in demand 
are expected for future issues, the size of the second issue seems to be in excess of what would 
be predicted by this argument. Related to this point, the extent of the excess in the demand 
makes it difficult to argue that the Council of Ten expected a fall in the popularity of Venetian 
assets at the time. Rather, secular trends imply that probably the expectation was that future 
issues would have been sold at a lower rather than higher rate. In fact, over the following years 
the rate decreased until, as mentioned earlier, in 1577 the Senate decide to extinguish the debt. 
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indirect taxation. However, the contrast with Genoa, which shared both features,23 
highlights that these conditions were not sufficient. As summarised by table 4, the 
different effects of a republican constitution on interest rates at Genoa and Venice can 
be explained by the specific institutional settings, contingency and path dependency. 
More markedly than at Genoa, the Venetian nobility was a closed and cohesive 
body, with direct influence on the elected magistracies. Thus, save very rare exceptions, 
as mentioned earlier (cf. section 3), only Venetian residents with an aristocratic father 
could sit in the Great Council, but all the Venetian nobility shared this privilege. In 
consequence, the Venetian aristocracy developed a particularly strong sense of 
superiority towards the outsiders and equality within its ranks. Moreover, election to 
both agencies setting the interest rates, the Senate and the Council of Ten, lasted one 
year only, which naturally implied a high degree of accountability (Lane, 1973a).  
Short-term appointment characterised also the Genoese Senate and Chamber: 
one fourth of their members was renewed every six months with random draws. 
However, the Genoese nobility was both more open and factionalised than the Venetian 
one,24 with periodical new entries from the middle-classes and recurrent distributional 
conflicts between segments of the nobility. Factionalism was reduced but not eliminated 
after the 1528 oligarchic constitution, as the 1576 civil war testifies (Felloni, 1998: 277; 
Hanlon, 2000: 50; Bitossi, 2007a; 2007b: 82-83). Crucially, random draws for both the 
low and high councils restricted the scope for clientelism (Felloni, 1998: 278). Such 
institutions made collusive behaviour (deliberate or otherwise) difficult to sustain. In this 
respect, Satasavage’s (2011) emphasis on the end of factionalism in the aftermath of 
1528 seems misplaced: in fact, the contrast with Venice suggests that its relative 
persistence favoured the assertion of a policy of low interest rates at Genoa.   
In the middle-ages, across the Italian city-states of the centre and the north, 
credits of the public debts were locally concentrated in the hands of the wealthy and 
charitable institutions; as in early modern Venice, servicing the public debt through 
indirect taxation implied a steady upward circulation of wealth. This dynamic was well-
known, and fostered periodical popular revolts like that of Boccanegra at Genoa in 
1259 and the Ciompi at Florence in 1378 (Molho, 1995: 107-108; Goldthwaite, 2009: 
327-329; Stasavage, 2011: 119-120). Clearly, the system whereby the local patricians 
tended to invest locally and interest rates were kept artificially high was a self-
reinforcing one.  
At Genoa, too, most of the bonds were locally held: as late as 1629, 92 per cent 
of the S. Giorgio’s securities belonged to local citizens and institutions (Pezzolo, 2005: 
156). However, from around this time, the Genoese oligarchs distinguished themselves 
                                                 
23 In 1550, 95.60 per cent of taxation of the Republic of Genoa was indirect (Felloni, 1998: 288); 
this compares with 90 per cent for the Republic of Venice in 1580 (Piola Caselli, 1997: 193). 
Although these shares declined somewhat in the intervening period they remained well-above 
those observed in the other regional states, with the partial exception of the Papacy. Sources: 
Duchy of Milan: Piola Caselli (1997: 193); Grand Duchy of Tuscany: Litchfield (1986: 99-100); 
Kingdom of Naples: Calabria (1991: 59-63); Piola Caselli (1997: 193); Papacy: Piola Caselli (1997: 
193); Piedmont: Stumpo (1979: 33); Symcox (1983: 59). 
24 This difference is noticed also by Greif (2006: 172-177) for the middle ages. The analysis 
presented here suggests that in contrast to Greif’s position, the economic consequences of a 
factionalised ruling class were not necessarily negative. 
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by clearly departing from the pattern of mostly investing in local annuities, as they 
began to heavily invest in the debts of Rome, Milan, and especially Venice, as well as 
elsewhere in Europe (Felloni, 1971, 1998: 664-665, 2007: 135).25  
This movement occurred in strict correlation with a sudden inflow of capital after 
the defaults by Philip II, Philip III and Philip IV’s of 1596, 1607 and 1627. These episodes 
tested the Genoese’s financiers taste for risk, and led them to severing their links with 
the Spanish crown, bringing the loaning capital back home (Felloni, 1998: 665, 2007: 
135). This capital inflow can be seen also in the fall in Genoese interest rates from the 
1620s noticed earlier, which, in turn, stimulated investment elsewhere in the peninsula. 
In consequence, another self-reinforcing strategy crystallised itself: the more oligarchs 
invested in foreign annuity markets, the weaker the incentive to keep local interest rates 
high. In summary, different effects of a republican constitution goes a long way in 
explaining apparent anomalies on the Venetian and Genoese markets. The next section 
systematically examines the causes of cross-sectional variation across Italy.  
 
5. The panel 
Table 5 shows the results of the panel data regression analysis.26 The first 
specification, models political regimes only in terms of constitutional structure; the 
second one includes also fiscal variables; the third one introduces jurisdictional variables; 
the last specification allows a republican constitution to have a different effect in Genoa 
and Venice, by letting the republican dummy interact with a Venetian dummy.27  
Under the first two specifications a republican constitution is associated with 
comparatively low interest rates, but only inconsistently so. In consequence, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. In other words, the results suggest that 
excluding private and forced loans implies that the advantage of pre-modern oligarchic 
constitutions over princely ones is less consistent than found by previous studies (cf. 
                                                 
25 The S. Giorgio’s ledgers record that at the beginning of the eighteenth century the interest 
payments for Genoese investors on Venetian securities were in the order of over four times those 
on the Papacy’s and the Austrian’s securities, which followed them in importance (cf. Felloni, 
1971: 509-519). This, too, demonstrates that the Venetian bonds were unusually attractive for 
investors. 
26 Heavy reliance on time-invariant variables renders a fixed effects vector decomposition model 
(Plümber and Troeger, 2007, 2011) suitable for the estimation. In particular, by construction 
Republic, Republic*Venice, and Church are time-invariant; Parliament and Feudalism are only 
rarely-changing, so that a fixed-effects estimation of their effect is inefficient: it would consider 
only their effect on Naples’ and Palemo’s interest rates, respectively. The results presented here 
are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including: using random-effects, taking the 
log of continuous variables, controlling for inflation in central and northern Italy, controlling for 
state urbanisation, treating Treasury as time-invariant, not adjusting for short-term annuities at 
Venice, assuming that in the Republics the feudal population was the same as in Tuscany instead 
of half of it, and using war-years instead of the war pressure index. 
27 Effectively this is equivalent to allow the republican variable explaining the peculiarities of the 
Venetian and Genoese markets not accounted for by the other variables. Although this may 
introduce a positive bias in the estimated significance of the variable, as there are only two time-
invariant republican regimes, this is the best feasible measure. Moreover, as argued at length (cf. 
section 4) the assumption that a republican constitution was the key distinguishing factor 
underlying the cost of public borrowing at Venice and Genoa is justified.   
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Stasavage, 2007, 2011). Moreover, the third specification suggests that the negative 
association is partly due to omitted variable bias. Once one takes into account that 
republics tended to suffer comparatively little from feudalism and clerical influence, their 
advantage disappears. Under the fourth specification a republican constitution matters 
again, and this time the relevant coefficients are highly significant. This finding shows 
that even after systematically controlling for other factors, the hypothesis that a 
republican constitution had a different effect in the two Republics is accepted: the size 
of the interaction coefficient implies that a republican constitution decreased interest 
rates at Genoa, but increased them at Venice, by about the same amount.  
Turning to the other variables, including controls for jurisdictional fragmentation 
also implies that the sign of Parliament becomes negative. This is as expected and 
suggests that a positive sign in the two other specifications is due to omitted-variable 
bias. The coefficient becomes highly statistically significant under the last specification, 
although its size remains significantly lower than that of Republic. In fact, a role for 
parliament in limiting the risk of default, albeit not as effectively as a republican 
constitution, agrees with qualitative evidence. Thus, in 1566 the Sicilian parliament 
successfully resisted the king’s attempt to forcibly reduce the interest rate on 
government bonds from 10 to 6 per cent (Koenigsberger, 1969: 134). While throughout 
the sixteenth century Naples regularly paid creditors, it partially defaulted to a 
progressively increasing extent between 1622 and 1641, and outright defaulted in 1642 
(Felloni, 1971: 304; Calabria, 1991: 128-129).  In the same year, as mentioned in 
section 3, the Neapolitan parliament was dissolved for good. In the aftermath, more 
defaults and compulsory withdrawal of funds from the creditors followed (Felloni, 1971: 
304-311).   
Under all specifications, fiscal centralisation did not matter much; this result holds 
even after controlling for the fact that fiscally centralising princely states tended to 
having to cope with marked feudal and clerical fiscal immunities. All in all, it seems that 
urban autonomy in the fiscal realm was not particularly harmful in terms of increasing 
the risk of default. In fact, this finding sits well with: firstly, low interest rates in early 
modern Italy in general, where urban communities tended to be particularly powerful;28 
and, secondly, particularly low interest rates in Genoa, where the republican model of 
contractual union of autonomous communities found a paradigmatic embodiment. 
Furthermore, if anything, early centralisation mattered more than fiscal reform in 
the eighteenth century, whose coefficient does not even have the expected sign. This is 
surprising in light of the fact that more clearly than former the latter resulted in obvious 
increases in state revenues. Yet, inspection of the data confirms that, for example, 
interest rates on annuities sold at Turin in 1758 were no lower than in 1688, being both 
                                                 
28 A quick comparison suggests that on average, the Italian rates were about 1 percentage point 
lower than in early modern France and eighteenth-century Britain, and about 0.5 percentage 
points lower than in early modern Spain and higher than in seventeenth-century Holland. Souces: 
Italy: see the appendix; Britain: Weir (1989: 100, 109, 114-117),  Munro (2003: 557); France: 
Weir (1989: 155, 122), Velde and Weir (1992: 17, 23, 26), Pezzolo (1999: 252), Munro (2003: 
540, 2007: 35); Holland: Tracy (1985: 45, 60, 89, 95, 133-134, 207, 209), Munro (2003: 557); 
Spain: Munro (2003: 535), Grafe (2012: 15). 
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at 4 per cent (Einaudi, 1908: 209; Prato, 1908: 402).29 In other words, interest rates had 
not declined at Turin after the end of the War of Austrian Succession (1740-1747), 
despite the fact that by then the Savoyard State conformed more closely than any other 
early modern Italian regional state to the ideal type of the “fiscal-military state” (cf. 
Storrs, 2009). 
The little relevance of fiscal structures that can be observed may owe something 
to the particular early modern conditions: at the time information on the state finances 
were not publicly available. However, difficulties with the model whereby 
heterogeneous tax rates embody free-riders problems (cf. Dincecco, 2009a, 2009b, 
2012) need to be stressed, too. Although the tax-burden was unevenly distributed 
across the various communities forming Italian regional states, typically, the total sum to 
be collected through direct taxation (the mensuale at Milan, the tasso in Piedmont, the 
gravezze in the Republic of Venice, the fiscali at Naples) was centrally decided (Bulgarelli 
Lukacs, 1993: 81-112).  
Needless to say, an element of bargaining in setting the overall fiscal burden, as 
well as in apportioning the shares, was involved, but this characterised also to systems 
relying on coercion to a comparatively high extent, such as the Piedmontese one 
(Vester, 2000, 2001; Pezzolo, 2012). Hence, fiscal fragmentation implied iniquities and 
waste, which were only partly mitigated by centralised fiscal agencies. But, across the 
Italian states, heterogeneous tax rates did not in itself entail particular vulnerability to 
prisoner’s dilemma like sub-optimal overall levels of taxation; in fact, at times, as in the 
Kingdom of Naples before Masaniello’s revolt of 1647, the level was unsustainably high 
(Pezzolo, 2012: 283).  
Statistically significant and positively signed coefficients for Feudalism and Church 
suggest that the high costs of the debt in the Spanish territories were associated with 
jurisdictional fragmentation. This can be partly traced to social conflict, as bonds were 
concentrated in the hands of the middle-class, who was competing for power and 
influence with feudal lords, whose wealth was based on land. Thus, as shown by Luigi 
de Rosa’s (1958) meticulous study, public securities at Naples were disproportionately in 
the hands of the local bourgeoisie. According to Rosario Villari’s (1978: 265) classical 
study, in seventeenth-century Naples, this was a source of tension with the barons, who 
resented the political influence gained by the bourgeoisie by investing in the public 
debt: the “traditional aristocracy … sense[s] the threat and conducts a struggle against 
the attempts of this <<bourgeoisie>> to conquer … social, economic and political 
power … There is a struggle against financial speculations, against the manoeuvres of 
the tax-farmers”. 
Although the picture was less clear-cut elsewhere in the Kingdom of Naples, with 
feudal lords owning a high proportion of the provincial debts (Zilli, 1997), in other 
feudal states the social origin of investors resembles that found in the capital. Thus, at 
Milan between the sixteenth and the early seventeenth century, most of the purchasers 
of tax alienations were from the local urban middle-class and patriciate (De Luca, 2007: 
                                                 
29 The overall average in the 1680s was only 0.5 percentage points higher than in the 1750s, 
which being at 4 per cent remained significantly higher than the average figure for Italy at the 
same time, 3.4. 
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133).  In Piedmont, too, the traditional ruling class accounted for only a minority of the 
buyers of annuities; these were mostly in the hands of the bourgeoisie and recently 
appointed nobility of office (Stumpo, 2007: 162). That across these and other markets 
religious orders were active participants matches a less consistent effect for Church than 
for Feudalism. 
As predicted by neo-institutional literature, similarly to France (Béguin, 2012), 
territories like Milan and Naples where feudal lords and clerics significantly fragmented 
judicial power were characterised by uneven and personal protection of property rights: 
different interest rates were paid depending on the importance of the lender and it was 
common in cases of partial defaults to treat different creditors differently, at times in an 
openly fraudulent manner (Marsilio, 2008; Pezzolo, 2012: 278-279). For example, in 
1651, amidst pressure form the Sicilian viceroy, interest payments owed by Milan to 
Genoese investors were re-directed towards Palermo (Marsilio, 2008: 169). Such 
dynamics were bound to significantly increase risk for the investors and transaction costs 
on the market. The next section offers an insight into the actual relevance of these costs 
by quantifying the impact of jurisdictional fragmentation and the other variables.  
 
6. The roots of difference 
Table 6 measures the importance of political regimes and other factors in 
accounting for variations in interest rates across early modern Italy. The columns show 
the share of the total predicted difference explained by financial development (Time and 
Urban Potential), war (War Pressure), constitutional representation (Republic and 
Parliament), fiscal centralisation (Treasury and Fiscal reform), jurisdictional fragmentation 
(Feudalism and Church), and other place-specific factors (the city specific fixed-effect).30 
The last row shows the average contributions weighted by number of observations. The 
computations are based on the results of the fourth specification of the panel data 
analysis, the one that allows a republican constitution to have an ambivalent effect. 
There is little doubt that political regimes mattered a lot for the cost of public 
borrowing:  on average, altogether political regimes accounted for over two-thirds of 
the variation, as compared to about one fifth for financial development. Clearly, 
however, not all dimensions of political regimes were equally important. Fiscal 
centralisation did not matter much in accounting for cross-sectional variation. The 
highest value, c. 6 per cent, is found in Rome, where early fiscal centralisation 
contributed to keeping interest rates at a comparatively low level. Elsewhere, however, 
the contribution is significantly lower, and on average its value is only about 2 per cent.  
In all places except for the Republics, jurisdictional fragmentation is the single 
most important factor, its significance being particularly high in Milan and Naples, 
where feudalism was comparatively strong and jurisdictional fragmentation accounts for 
two-thirds of the variation. While both feudalism and clerical influence emerge as 
                                                 
30 Specifically, the figures are the shares of the sum of the absolute values of the difference 
predicted by each group of independent variables. Using absolute values makes it easy to 
compare the relative importance of the various factors since their effect often offset one another. 
In all cases, the error explains only a negligible share of the difference.   
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significant factors, the effect of the latter was significantly stronger than that of the 
former: on average, over twice as much. This result is consistent with the perspective 
that feudal institutions, more markedly than those associated to the Church, implied 
fragmented patchworks of rule that were not conducive to stable exchange 
relationships (van Zanden, 2009: 56-57). In the Republics, a republican constitution 
emerges as the most important factor: there, about half of the variation is accounted for 
by the constitutional variables, with the republican variables being responsible for the 
lion’s share of this contribution. 
Although wars consistently increased interest rates and the bigger the war the 
higher the increase, on the whole war mattered relatively little; only 4 per cent on 
average. Partial exceptions are found in Milan and Rome, for opposite reasons. Thus, 
particularly high war pressure helps explaining comparatively high interest rates at 
Milan. By contrast, relatively peaceful conditions significantly contributed to keeping the 
cost of public borrowing low for the Papacy. Yet, all is all, even allowing for a negative 
bias in the estimated significance of war resulting from neglecting that actual interest 
rates were higher during wars than official figures suggest, and that war could imply 
higher interest rates also four neutral states, war emerges as looking a lot more like a 
temporary incident than a game-changer.  
Altogether the model performs pretty well: on average only c. 5 per cent of the 
variation is explained by unobserved city-specific factors. It is noteworthy that in this 
respect the Papacy is in line with the general result. This is despite the fact that there the 
burden of the debt was significantly and consistently higher than in the other states 
(Pezzolo, 1995: 329-330; Stumpo, 2007: 157). In a comparison with France, credible 
commitment of the Papacy has been associated to its peculiar status as perpetual 
institution (Pezzolo, 1999). However, within the Italian context, this feature was shared 
by the other states, with the city being usually the body officially responsible of repaying 
the public debt. The present analysis casts a new light: low interest rates paid by Rome 
were associated to a centralising, instead of fragmenting, role for the clergy; the role of 
canon law as a particularly effective means of contract enforcement (cf. Zuijderduijn, 
2009: 135) also deserves to me mentioned in this respect. 
The explanatory power of the model is comparatively low for Florence and Turin. 
The sign of the fixed effects imply that on the basis of the other variables interest rates 
should have been higher in Florence and lower in Turin than observed. Probably in 
Florence the legacy of republican traditions and institutions played a role in fostering 
credible commitment and low interest rates, not least because there was a marked 
continuity in the families from which the state personnel was drawn (Litchfield, 1986). 
This was seen also in the fact that, as mentioned earlier, the local currency remained 
particularly stable in the early modern years, which contributed to reducing the risk of 
Florentine securities, too.31 A comparatively low debt had to be another contributing 
factor. 
And yet, the weight of the debt was lower still in Turin – in fact, at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century it was about half as much as in Florence (Stumpo, 2007: 157). 
                                                 
31 As shown by Chilosi and Volckart (2010), city-states tended to debase the currency for fiscal 
reasons less than princely states. 
28 
Unexpectedly high interest rates paid by Turin may be partly due to the fact that the 
figure used to measure the influence of feudalism there is too low. They are also 
associated with singularly low levels of urbanisation in Piedmont,32 whose commercial 
development lagged behind that of the other regional states. Still, they further 
strengthen the finding that the development of the “fiscal-military state” was not 
particularly significant for reducing the risk of default. 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has shown that in early modern Italy political regimes mattered for the 
cost of public borrowing; indeed, altogether they mattered significantly more than 
financial development in accounting for cross-sectional variations. In other words, the 
analysis refutes the sceptical perspective that institutions mattered little, and the cost of 
public borrowing was mainly determined by development of financial services and 
geopolitical stability. However, it is important to distinguish: not all dimensions of 
political regimes mattered to the same extent.  
Fiscal centralisation, particularly in the eighteenth century, was not associated 
with significant decreases in the interest rates. Difficulties with applying to early modern 
Italy the model whereby uneven taxation was associated with sub-optimal fiscal pressure 
have been highlighted, thus inviting a re-assessment of the actual significance of fiscal 
centralisation also in other contexts. Related to this point war consistently increased 
interest rates, but uneven war pressure is of relatively little help in explaining variations 
in interest rates across regional states. In short, the Italian data examined here suggest 
that the literature may be making too much of the development of the “fiscal-military” 
state as a determinant of the performance of early modern economies.  
Jurisdictional fragmentation was on the whole the most important factor in 
accounting for different interest rates across regional states, with feudalism and to a 
lesser extent clerical influence significantly increasing the cost of borrowing. This has 
been traced to social conflict, as the middle-classes tended to own a high proportion of 
the public debt, and uneven and personal protection of property rights. As predicted by 
neo-institutional literature, transparency and predictability of the institutional framework 
were of key importance in determining transaction costs. While these findings 
corroborate those of other similar studies, they also offer a novel insight into the actual 
quantitative significance of jurisdictional fragmentation for transaction costs: these 
emerge as being very large indeed. 
Parliaments helped mitigating the impact of jurisdictional fragmentation in 
increasing the risk of default in Southern Italy, but were not as effective as republican 
institutions. Republican constitutions were even more important than jurisdictional 
fragmentation in explaining the local cost of public borrowing within republics, but they 
had an ambivalent effect: although they decreased the risk of default, they could also 
lead to interest rates being set above the cost-minimising level. Whether such a policy 
was implemented depended on institutions, as it was favoured by closed and cohesive 
                                                 
32 Sources: city-populations: Malanima (2005b); state-populations: Cipolla (1965). 
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oligarchies directly monitoring the agents managing the public debt, contingency, as 
external shocks could suddenly lower local interest rates, thus promoting inter-city 
investments, and path-dependency, as locally concentrated investments strengthened 
the incentive to keep local interest rates high. As well as being the most original finding 
of the paper, this result highlights that creditors’ management of the public debt is 
risky, rather than inevitably welfare increasing. 
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Appendix 1: sources of the interest rates 
Florence: ASF, Monte Comune o delle Graticole, parte I, pezzo 3: 260; ASF, 
Monte Comune o delle Graticole, parte I, pezzo 4: 20;  ASF, Monte del Sale, Pezzo 1; 
ASF, Monte del Sale, pezzo 2: 7, 15, 19, 24;  ASF, Monte di Pietà, Pezzo 3; ASF, Monte 
di Sussidio Vacabile e Non Vacabile, Pezzo 2; ASF, Monte di Sussidio Vacabile e Non 
Vacabile, Pezzo 3; ASF, Monte di Sussidio Vacabile e Non Vacabile, pezzo 142: 359-361; 
ASF, Monte di Sussidio Vacabile e Non Vacabile, pezzo 143: 2-3; ASF, Nuovo Monte 
Comune, Pezzo 383; Cantini (1804a: 255, 1804b: 28, 1805a: 247, 1805b: 272, 1806a: 
174, 1806b: 21, 1806c: 146, 227, 262, 1807a: 352, 1807b: 7, 53, 113, 144); Cochrane 
(1973: 198-199); Dal Pane (1965: 10); Felloni (1971: 284); Menning (1993: 140, 144, 
149, 280-285); Stumpo (1984: 223). 
 
Genoa: ASG, Antica Finanza, Pandetta 38, numero 322; ASG, Antica Finanza, 
Pandetta 38, numero 344; ASG, Archivio Segreto, 9/1026; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, 
Pandetta 17, numero 3081: 55-57; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 
3082; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3083: 5; ASG, Banco di S. 
Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3084; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 
3085: 5, 278; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3086; ASG, Banco di S. 
Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3087: 3-4, 8, 12, 17; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 
17, numero 3088; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3089: 26-27; ASG, 
Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3090; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, 
numero 3091: 26, 97; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3092; ASG, 
Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3093: 25; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 
17, numero 3094; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3095; ASG, Banco di 
S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3111: 1, 444, 448, 460, 462, 471, 474, 483, 493-494, 
535, 559; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3112: 115, 244, 279, 453; 
ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3113: 50, 132, 141, 213, 288, 306, 
347; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3114: 17, 29, 38, 59, 104, 123, 
209, 275, 574, 622, 765; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3115: 63, 
127, 161, 215, 272, 311, 328, 402, 462, 509; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, 
numero 3116: 9, 10, 29, 261, 306, 336, 539, 631, 682, 717; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, 
Pandetta 17, numero 3177; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3135; ASG, 
Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3137; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, 
numero 3138; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3140; ASG, Banco di S. 
Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3142; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 
3144; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3181; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, 
Pandetta 17, numero 3182; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 17, numero 3184; ASG, 
Banco di S. Giorgio, pandetta 18, numero 610/2464; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, 
Pandetta 18, numero 610/2471; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 18, numero 
610/2472; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, pandetta 18, numero 610/2473; ASG, Banco di S. 
Giorgio, pandetta 18, numero 610/2474; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 18, 
numero 610/2475; ASG, Banco di S. Giorgio, Pandetta 18, numero 610/2476; ASG, 
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Figure 1: Interest rates observations, 1520-1796: Spatial distribution 
 
 Sources: see the appendix. 
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Figure 2: Nominal interest rates in Italy, 1520s-1790s 
 
 
Note: Interest rates are normalised to perpetuity. 
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Table 1: Observations by annuity type and source type 
   
      Source type: Edict Ledger Secondary Historian Total 
   
Market 
  Annuity type:           
      Alienation 36 
  
289 325 
Life annuity 65 
  
21 86 
Monte di pietà 
   
10 10 
Perpetuity 160 518 4 225 907 
Term annuity 157 
  
38 195 
Total 418 518   583 1523 
 




Table 2: The independent variables 
 Variable Expected sign 
Time - 
Urban potential - 











Table 3: The cost of public borrowing in Italy (comparison with Rome), 
1520s-1790s: Ordinary least squares regression analysis 
 
     
  Coefficient Marginal effect 
  
 
Constant 7.181*** 38.190 
Time -0.003*** -0.018 
Florence -0.043*** -0.229 
Genoa -0.400*** -2.126 
Milan 0.299*** 1.595 
Naples 0.360*** 1.913 
Palermo 0.305*** 1.622 
Turin 0.200*** 1.061 
Venice 0.130*** 0.690 
      
R-squared 0.826  
N 170   
 
 N = Sample size.  
*** = Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
Notes: Clustered standard errors allow for arbitrary within city correlation. 





Table 4: A tale of two republics 
   















local interest rates 
Local investment, 






Table 5: Political regimes and the cost of public borrowing: Panel 
data regression analysis 
          
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Constant 6.866*** 6.875*** 6.415*** 6.403*** 
Time -0.003 -0.003 -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Urban potential -0.003 -0.003 -0.003*** -0.003*** 
War pressure 0.249*** 0.253*** 0.253*** 0.253*** 
Republic -0.284 -0.294 0.078 -0.378*** 
Republic*Venice 
   
0.779*** 
Parliament 0.262 0.259 -0.092 -0.107*** 
Treasury 
 
-0.019 -0.019 -0.019 
Fiscal reform 
 







          
Adj. R-squared 0.832 0.830 0.828 0.827 
N 170 170 170 170 
N = Sample size. 
* = Significant at the 1 per cent level. 
** = Significant at the 5 per cent level. 
*** = Significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Notes: Fixed effects vector decomposition model estimation (Plümber and Troeger, 2007, 
2011). The following variables are classified as time-invariant: Republic, Parliament, 
Church and Feudalism. Clustered standard errors allow for arbitrary within city 
correlation. 







Table 6: Political regimes and the cost of public borrowing: Regression 
decomposition analysis (in percentage) 
                
 
War Financial Constitution Fiscal  Jurisdictional  Place 
    Development   centralisation Fragmentation   
       Florence 3.93 31.06 0.89 1.29 45.90 16.94 
Genoa 2.22 6.58 48.42 0.90 41.87 0.01 
Milan 12.27 22.24 2.14 3.16 59.81 0.38 
Naples 0.37 32.36 4.14 1.13 60.33 1.67 
Palermo 0.43 23.08 21.36 1.44 49.33 4.36 
Rome 8.17 22.65 2.17 5.92 55.37 5.72 
Turin 3.85 16.41 0.86 0.82 58.64 19.41 
Venice 0.39 0.35 51.53 0.88 46.84 0.01 
       Average 4.14 20.58 16.66 2.15 54.72 5.28 
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